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EXCEPTION TO MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIWILEGES FOR CRIMES DONE TO CHILDREN
OF EITHER SPOUSE
Henry A. Escoto
INTRODUCION

In Johnson v. United States,' a case of first impression, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a "necessity exception" to the
marital communications privilege under D.C. CODE ANN. Section 14-306(b) l is
properly expanded to include crimes against the child of either spouse.'
The defendant in Johnson argued that the trial court erred in admitting his
common-law wife's testimony regarding statements he made to her before and
after the death of their eight-month-old child. Johnson contended this admission
by the trial court violated the marital communications privilege under § 14306(b). Johnson argued that the court's admission of his wife's testimony was
"unsupported by precedent," 4 that the legislature had explicitly eliminated the
marital communications privilege in "Family Division proceedings where the
welfare of the child was the primary concern," 5 but had retained it in criminal and
civil proceedings. Furthermore, Johnson argued that the D.C. Court of Appeals
could only uphold the trial court's ruling if it found that, "[t]he legislature acted
in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or irrational manner in delineating the
applicability of the marital privilege." The government argued that the court has
always looked to the common law to interpret the marital communications
privilege under Section 14-306." Further, the government argued the legislature

1. 616 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1611 (1993).
2. D.C CODE A 'N. § 14-306 (1993) provides:
(a) In civil or criminal proceedings. a husband or his wife is competent. but not compellable. to testify for
or against the other.
(b) In civil and criminal proceedings, a husband or his wife is not competent to testify as to any
confidential communications made by one to the other during the marriage.
3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also addressed the issues or whether the tnal court
wrongfully: (I) denied defendant's motion to suppress oral and written statements to the police. (2) allowed
constructive amendment to the indictment and, (3) denied defendant's motion and a hearing of his ineffective
assistance claims. These issues are not addressed in this note.
4.

616 A.2d at 1220.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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never intended to preclude common law interpretations of the marital
communications privilege in criminal cases. 8 The government contended those
prior statutory exceptions to the privilege only dealt with, "discrete areas of the
law--civil protection orders, child neglect proceedings, and the termination of
parental rights-and how the husband-wife privilege should intersect with that
area."
The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the government's contention that the
court had always looked to the common law to interpret the privilege in criminal
proceedings. The court stated that the marital communications privilege extended
to common law marriages. The court also stated that the common law recognizes
an exception to the privilege where, "the husband is charged with committing
wrongs directly on the person of the wife."' 0 The purpose of the statute was to
remove incompetency, not increase it." Other jurisdictions have extended the
"necessity exception" to crimes committed against a child of either spouse.' 2
Prosecution of a parent who kills his or her child serves the public interest of
protecting children.' 3 Therefore, an exception to the marital communications
privileges, "is properly expanded to include crimes done to a child of either
'4
spouse.""

FACrUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael C. Johnson was indicted for second degree murder while armed for the
death of his eight-month-old daughter. Johnson was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and cruelty to a child.' 5
On June 6, 1987, Johnson's common-law wife, Alecia Medley, returned to their
apartment from work and noticed a bruise on her daughter's temple.'0 She asked
Johnson what happened. Johnson told Medley that the baby had fallen off the

8. Id.
9. 616 A.2d at 1220.
denied,
10. 616 A.2d at 1222 (citing, Morgan v. United States, 363 A.2d 999, 1004 (D.C. 1976), cert.
431 U.S. 919 (1977).
11. Id. at 1223.
12. Id. at 1222.
13. Id. at 1224.
14. Id.
15. 616 A.2d at 1218.
16. Id.
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bed.17 Shortly after that, Medley left the apartment and returned home a few
hours later.
Upon her return, Johnson complained that the baby had cried all night. Medley
again, "[n]oticed a scratch behind one of the baby's ears."' 0 Again, Johnson told
her, "[tihe baby had fallen off the bed." 10
The baby began crying at some point. Johnson told the child to "shut her
mouth,"2 0 but the child continued crying. Johnson picked up a belt, took the baby
to the bathroom, and smacked her with a belt for two or three minutes. Johnson
then brought the child back to the bedroom and warned Medley not to pick up the
child and. to "let her holler" because he was raising the child his own way.21
The next morning Johnson and Medley found the baby was not breathing and
took her to a nearby firehouse. Paramedics at the firehouse were unable to revive
the child. The child was taken by ambulance to Children's Hospital. Ambulance
paramedics noticed extensive bruises, "[firom head to toe on all parts of her
body.""'

The government's medical expert testified that the cause of death was, "[m]ost
likely.., blows to the left side of her head."2 " He added that other injuries on her
body contributed to her death. The defense's medical expert generally agreed with
government's assessment. However, "[He] opined that the injuries to the left side
of the baby's head were the result of her head being accelerated against a flat
object." 2' 4

The government also offered Johnson's common law wife, Medley, as a witness,
to testify as to statements made to her by Johnson. Johnson objected that any
testimony Medley may give would fall under Section 14-306(b). 5
The trial judge held that statements made by Johnson to his common-law wife
were admissible.2" The trial court reasoned that there were three statutory
exceptions to the marital communication privilege. First, the privilege is not
available in child neglect proceedings;" intrafamily offenses proceedings;28 and in
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
17.

20.

616 A.2d at 1218.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1218-1219.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at n.5.
Id. (defense medical expert testified only as to the second-degree murder while armed charge).

25.

616 A.2d at 1219.

26. Id.
27. DC CODE AN,. § 2-1355 provides:
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parent-child termination proceedings.29 Second, neglect proceedings where physical
abuse is at issue, "cannot be any different than when they are in a criminal
case." 30 Furthermore, the trial court noted that the Supreme Court had recognized
other exceptions permitting one spouse to testify "in regard to communications of
assault against him or her by the other spouse."'"

COMMON LAW DOCTRINE

At common law, husband and wife were not permitted to testify, for or against
each other, as to any private communications during their marriage.3 2 This
privilege survived a divorce or death. 33 Further, this privilege was grounded in
public policy which considered the privilege to be so "essential to the preservation
of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration
s
34
of justice.
The District of Columbia recognizes common law marriages as valid
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 14-306 and 14-307, [the physician-patient privilege]
neither the husband-wife privilege nor the physician-patient privilege shall be grounds for excluding
evidence in any proceedings in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
concerning the welfare of a neglected child; provided that, that a judge of the Family Division of the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia determines that such privilege should be waived in the
interest of justice.
28. D.C. CODE A.,,. § 16-1005(b) provides:
Notwithstanding § 14-306. in a hearing under this section, one spouse shall be a competent and
compellable witness against the other and may testify as to confidential communications, but
testimony compelled over a claim of a privilege shall be conferred by such section shall be
inadmissible in evidence in a criminal trial over the objection of a spouse entitled to claim the
privilege.
29. D.C CODE A\. § 16-2359(e) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of D.C. Code, sections 14-306 and 14-307, neither the husband-wife
privilege nor the physician-client or mental health professional-client privilege shall be a ground for
excluding evidence in any proceeding brought under this subchapter.
30. 616 A.2d at 1220.
31. Id.; See, Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 (1959) (exception to the privilege "rcst[si on
the necessity of preventing the defendant from sealing his wife's lips by his own unlawful act"); See also.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46, n.7 (1959) (noting exception to privilege includes crimes against
children of either spouse)
32. Hopkins v. Grimshaw. 165 U.S. 342. 351 (1897) (holding wife incompetent to testify as to private
conversation between husband and wife), See. e.g.. United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1969) ("It was the general rule of the common law that neither husband nor wife was a competent witness
either for or against the other in any case, civil or criminal").
33. 165 U.S. at 349.
34. Wolflc v. United States. 291 U.S. 7. 14 (1934).
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marriages,s 5 and applies the marital communications privilege to common law
marriage.38 Excluded are communications engaged in before entering into the
marriage s7 and marriages not recognized by the common law.38 Acts of one spouse
witnessed by the other spouse do not constitute confidential communications.3
Criminal acts seen by another.spouse do not necessarily suggest the fact that,
"[q]ualities of communication of confidentiality flow automatically."' 0 Thus, an
assault on a spouse is not a confidential communication nor are threats made in
the presence, of others.

1

EXCEPTIONS TO THE MARITAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE

Common law recognizes an exception to the marital communication privilege
where a spouse's personal safety is an issue or one spouse has committed a wrong

against the other spouse. 2 As noted in Johnson, the basis for the exception is, "the
recognition that if a wife could not testify against her husband, he would have a
'vested license to injure her in secret with complete immunity.' "'s Furthermore,
the court noted that other courts have applied "necessity exceptions" to the

privilege to crimes committed against a child."
35. Hoage v. Murch Bros. Const.. 50 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (holding common-law marrage valid
under District of Columbia law).
36. Bowler v. United States. 480 A.2d 678 (D.C. 1984) (marital communications privilege applies to
common-law marriages).
37. See. Hallbach v. Hill. 261 F. 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1919) (letters written b) uife to her husband before
marriage held not confidential communications and inadmissible as evidence)
38. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2230. at 223 (McNaughton 1961)
39. United States v. Lewis. 433 F2d 1146, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ('[Acts do notl
become confidential
communications merely because during coverture they are performed by one spous& in the presence of the
other").
40. Id.
41. See, Morgan v. United States. 363 A.2d 999. 1004 (D.C. 1976). cert denied. 431 US 919 (1977).
42. Id. at n.5; See, United States v. Fitton, 25 F.Cas. 1092 (C.C. D.C. 1835) (No. 15.106) (%ife is
permitted to testify against husband charged with assault upon her). United States . Smalkoad. 27 F Cas.
1131 (C.C.D.C. 1836) (No. 16.316) (government may call wife as witness to testify against husband on
charges of assault and battery).
43. Johnson v. United States. 616 A.2d 1216. 1222 (D.C 1992). certdenied. U.S. 113
S.Ct. 1611. 123 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993) (citing, Morgan v,United States. 363 A 2d 999. 1004. 8 J WIGtitRE.
supra note 38, at 242.
44. 616 A.2d at 1222 (citing. Adams v. State, 563 S.W 2d 804. 809 (Tenn Cram App 1978)
(expanding -necessity exception* to crimes against children of either spouse "because such 'communications
fail to satisfy the conditions underlying the creation of the privilege,*)): United States v.Allery. 526 F 2d 1362
(8th Cir. 1975) (expanding "necessity exception*' to crimes against children of either spouse). See generally.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 14-306

In 1864, Congress enacted a rule of evidence designed to make any party or
person "competent and compellable to give evidence ...on behalf of either or any
of the parties to said action or other proceeding."'45 Husbands and wives, however,
were exempt from being compelled, and were held incompetent to give evidence in
any criminal proceeding." District of Columbia courts later adopted this rule of
41
evidence.
In 1901, Congress revised and adopted this provision as sections 1068 and
1069.48 Section 1068 provided, "In both civil and criminal proceedings, husband
and wife shall be competent, but not compellable, to testify for or against each
other."' 49 Section 1069 provided, "In neither civil nor criminal proceedings shall a
husband or his wife be competent to testify as to any confidential communications
made by one to the other during the marriage." 0 In 1963, Congress adopted
51
sections 1068 and 1069 as section 14-306 of the D.C. Code.

LEGAL REASONING

In reaching its decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals first
analyzed the marital communications privilege under common law doctrine and
then distinguished the rationale behind the old and the modern rules. The marital
communications privilege, said the Court, "sprang from two canons of medieval
jurisprudence." 52 Under the first rule, "an accused was not permitted to testify in

Wayne F. Foster. Annotation. Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against Other in Prosecution for Offense
Against Child of Both or Either, 93 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1979 & Supp. 1993). For other exceptions at common
law. see 8 J WIGMORE. supra note 38, at 242-253.
45. Hopkins v. Grimshaw. 165 U.S. 342, 350 (1897) (quoting, Act or July 2, 1864, § 222, 13 Stat. 374
(codified as Rev.St.D.C. §§ 876, 877 (1864). Recodified as DC CODE ANN. §§ 1068, 1069 (1901), now as
DC CODE ANN § 14-306 (1993)).
46. Id.
47. Id.; Rev.St.D.C. §§ 876, 877 (1864).
48. 31 Stat. 1358 (1901).
49. See. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 48, 49, n.9. (1980), (citing Halbach v. Hill, 261 F. 1010
(D.C. 1919) (purpose of statute was to remove, not increase, incompetency)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Johnson v. United States. 616 A.2d 1216, 1221 (D.C. 1992) cert. denied, - U.S. -.
113 S.Ct
1611 (1993).
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his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding."' 3 Under the second rule,
the wife and husband were considered as one and because "the woman had no
recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one."" Under those
"long-abandoned doctrines, it followed that what was inadmissible from the lips of
'
the defendant-husband was also inadmissible from his wife." 5
Modern law, however, no longer prevents defendants from testifying in their
own behalf.5 The law now recognizes a separate legal existence of the wife from
the husband. 7 The modern rationale for the privilege is "[its role in] fostering the
harmony and sanctity of the marriage.""5
The court next reviewed common law to interpret the exception to the marital
communications privilege. Under common law, an exception existed where a
husband was charged with committing wrongs directly against his wife."" This
"necessity exception" was "based on the recognition that if a wife could not testify
against her husband, he would have a 'vested license to injure her in secret with
complete immunity.' "60 Furthermore, this exception is justified on the ground that
marital peace is obviously lacking."
The court acknowledged that other courts have extended the "necessity
exception" to include crimes committed against children of either spouse. 2
Furthermore, the court said that the privilege belongs to the spouse witness in
"adverse spousal testimony."6 3
In analyzing the statute further, the court found that "[t]he purpose of Congress
enacting section 14-306 was to remove, not increase, grounds of incompetency."'
While finding that the privilege is important in protecting confidential
communications between spouses, the court argued that "the welfare of a spouse
. . . [or] child of the parties or one of the parties [takes precedence] over the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
spouse).
64.
Hill. 261

Id.
Id.
Id.
616 A.2d at 1221.
Id.
Id. (citing. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
616 A.2d at 1222.
Id. (citing, 8 J WIoMORE. supra note 38. § 2239 at 242).
Id.
616 A.2d at 1222.
Id.: see also, Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525. 528 (1960) (privilege belongs to witness616 A.2d at 1223 (citing. Morgan v. United States. 363 A.2d 999. 1004 (D.C. 1976): Halbach v.
F. 1007. 1010 (D.C. 1919)).
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interests protected by the marital privilege." 5 While exceptions to the privilege
existed in child-neglect proceedings, interspousal abuse, and terminations of
parental rights procedures, the court observed that the legislature had never
addressed the issue presented in the instant case. 66
Finally, the court applied a public policy perspective to its holding. In civil abuse
or neglect proceedings, "there is an interest in preserving the 'family life of the
parents and children'

. . .

. But, the public interest in protecting children is served

by prosecuting a father who kills his child." 7 Furthermore, "an exception to the
marital privilege is particularly necessary to prevent parents from using the
privilege as a license to harm their own children, and particularly those children
who cannot speak for themselves." 8 Compelling to the court was the fact that the
victim in Johnson was an eight-month-old child who, if she had survived the
attack, could not communicate to others what her father had done to her. In this
situation, it is the appropriate role of the parent to testify in the child's behalf.
Finally, the court concluded, "a rule of evidence that permits an accused to
prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to
foster family peace."89

ANALYSIS

The Court in Johnson correctly expanded the "necessity exception" to the
marital communications privilege under D.C. Code Section 14-306 to situations
where a parent kills the child of either spouse. The decision is consistent with our
notion that children need to be protected from criminal acts against them,7 0
particularly from abusive parents. The decision is also consistent with our notion of
justice. It would be unjust to allow "a parent to escape criminal prosecution for

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1224. See. e.g., CAL EVID CODE § 985(a) (West 1993) (exception to marital
communications privilege where a spouse is charged with a crime against child of either); DEL UNiFORM
RULES OF EvaD 504(d)(2) (1993) (same); FLA STAT ANN. § 90.504(3)(b) (West 1979) (same); HAW RULES
OF EvID. § 505(c)(1)(B) (1993) (same); lit. ANN STAT. ch. 725, para. 126/6 (1993) (same); MD ANN
CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106 (1993) (same); TEX R CRIM EVID. 504(l)(d)(2) (West 1993) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-8d-8 (Michie 1993) (spouse witness cannot invoke privilege in child abuse proceedings).
67. 616 A.2d at 1224 (citing. D.C CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351).
68. Id. at 1225.
69. Id. (quoting, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)).
70. See generally. The Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1975 § 404 (1975)- Child Abuse
Act. 42 U.S.C.S. § 5100 et seq. (1993).
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harming his own child [but not) for harming the child of another." ' Furthermore,
the decision is consistent with the rulings in other jurisdictions," as well as the
7
policy rationale for upholding the marital communications privilege."
The court in Johnson settled the applicability of the privilege to crimes against
the child of either spouse. In Croom v. United States,7 4 the court affirmed a trial
court's decision compelling a wife to testify against the defendant-husband
regarding charges against him for taking indecent liberties and carnal knowledge
with his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter, despite D.C. Code Section 14-306(a)
(1981 ed.). 8 In that case, the defendant's wife was compelled to testify against her
husband after she voluntarily and intelligently testified before a grand jury as to
events crucial to the subsequent trial."8 Although not an issue in Croorn, the court,
in dictum, stated that it was a question for the legislature to determine the
applicability of the marital communications privilege for crimes against the
children of a witness spouse." The court in Johnson, however, squarely presented
with this issue, concluded that the exception to the privilege was applicable to
crimes against a child of either spouse. 8
CONCLUSION
The marital communications privilege under D.C. Code section 14-306(b) has
the effect of providing greater protection to a defendant-spouse by preventing a
witness-spouse from testifying against him for crimes done to the child of either
spouse, than for crimes committed against the child of another. The ruling in
Johnson, however, furthers child protection laws and policies because it prevents a
defendant-spouse from silencing, in most cases, the only witness to the crime
against the child of either or both. In future cases, the D.C. Court of Appeals will
most likely expand exceptions to the marital communications privilege to cases

71. 616 A.2d at 1225.
72. See, supra note 44.
73. 616 A.2d at 1221 (rationale for the privilege is to foster the harmony and sanctity of marriage)Morgan v. United States, 363 A.2d at 1004. n.5. (rationale for the privilege is keeping the family together and
keeping marriage impenetrable). See also. Coleman v. State. 380 A.2d 49 (hid. 1977).
74. 546 A.2d 1006 (D.C. 1988).
75. D.C. CODE ANN § 14-306(a) (1993) provides that. "In civil or criminal proceedings. husband or
wife is competent but not compellable to testify for or against the other."
76.

CROOt. 546 A.2d at 1008.

77.
78.

Id. at 1009. n.4.
See. 616 A.2d at 1224, n.13.
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where a spouse commits a crime against the child of either spouse that do not
result in the death of the child.79

79. 616 A.2d at 1224 (citing, United States v. Allery. 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (expanding
necessity exception to marital communications privilege for attempted rape against defendant's twelve-yearold daughter): Adams v. States, 563 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (expanding necessity exception to
marital communications privilege for murder by defendant of defendant's four-year-old stepson)).

